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1INTRODUCTION
The National Football League (nfl) has longed reigned as America’s favorite 
professional sports league, having surpassed Major League Baseball (mlb) 
and prevailed against the National Basketball Association (nba). Success 
may have spoiled the nfl, as the league has exhibited pompous and arro-
gant behavior. During the 1976 bicentennial celebrations, the nfl sponsored 
an essay contest for the schoolchildren of America on the topic “The nfl 
in American History.” Leading historians — including Henry Steele Com-
mager, who retorted, “It has no importance whatsoever” — scorned the 
league’s chutzpah.1 The league’s historical videos are renowned for their 
overly dramatic narration and unsubtle musical cues.2 One would think 
the narrator was describing the titanic struggle between the Red Army 
and the Wehrmacht instead of the Packers and Chiefs in the retroactively 
dubbed Super Bowl I. The league’s use of Roman numerals to denote Super 
Bowls has also taken its share of ridicule.
 nfl owners, though, have reason to be proud of their league. They collect 
huge sums of money from television networks. The Super Bowl (at least it is 
not named the “World Series”) is a national — and now a worldwide — event. 
More Americans watch the game than vote in Presidential elections. The 
current owners, however, rarely reflect on the league’s humble beginnings 
and adolescence. Even in the 1950s, after thirty seasons of operation, the 
nfl lacked the glamour and the profits of Major League Baseball. nfl 
owners barely survived the German- and Japanese-inspired disruption 
of their league. After World War II, the onset of peace seemed to provide 
a promise of prosperity as the demand for leisure pursuits increased, but 
that hope was dissipated when a new set of owners formed a rival league, 
the All-America Football Conference (aafc).3 As late as 1949, famed 
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2 Introduction
sportswriter Grantland Rice wrote, “Pro football can never compete with 
college football. No pro teams can ever match the drawing power of Notre 
Dame, Michigan, Southern California, smu, Army and Navy, Minnesota, 
Stanford and California and Texas, and too many others to mention.”4
 Despite Rice’s dismissal, even Presidents of the United States began 
paying attention to the nfl. The league cheered the news that President 
Truman would see some contests in the upcoming 1945 season. Now, of 
course, a presidential phone call to the Super Bowl champions is de rigueur.5
 The nfl’s ascent from obscurity to the front pages of the sports world 
during the 1950s raises many questions. How did the league achieve pros-
perity after years of struggle? How did the league defeat the rival aafc? 
Sports historians and observers frequently cite television and the league’s 
superior competitive balance (in comparison with Major League Baseball’s 
competitive balance) as critical factors that triggered the league’s rise. The 
league’s revenue-sharing, player draft, player reserve clause, and television 
policies were intertwined with competitive balance issues and are often 
credited with improving the league.6 The answers to these questions com-
prise the subsequent chapters of this book.
 The nfl owners’ and players’ actions are amenable to economic analysis. 
The owners and players possessed scarce resources (such as capital, labor, 
and stadium dates) that had alternative uses. All involved had to allocate 
their scarce resources among the alternative uses in ways that best served 
their interests and helped fulfill their goals.
 While owners, like most businesspeople, were politic enough not to 
claim they were trying to maximize profits, profit maximization or cost 
minimization could never be far from their minds given their sometimes 
slender capital reserves. An owner might, of course, jettison some profits 
if he thought he would win a championship. In this way, he might be 
thought a sportsman, the image so beloved by the owners and a number 
of sportswriters.
 Owners almost seemed to take pride in their announced losses. They 
seemed to espouse the view that there were few more enjoyable ways to lose 
money than by owning a sports team (which was preferable, apparently, to 
owning a slow racehorse). The issue of profitability in professional team 
sports is, to quote Winston Churchill, “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, 
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inside an enigma.” Owners had good reasons to be reticent about profits. 
They did not want players to have a reason to agitate for higher salaries, and 
they were wary of attracting and emboldening potential upstart leagues. 
The drawback to pleading poverty was that such depictions might dampen 
potential suitors’ interests and thereby suppress franchise values.
 nfl owners, though, would have had to be spectacularly inept if they 
failed to make profits, given adequate demand. They held two huge advan-
tages over the run-of-the-mill business owner. Because the league granted 
territorial rights — barring competition in an owner’s territory — an owner 
could set his ticket prices and behave monopolistically. Such price-setting 
power should have bolstered profits. Territorial rights afforded protection 
only within a league; no other league team could enter another team’s ter-
ritory without approval or compensation. Teams in other leagues, though, 
might enter an occupied territory and risk the legal wrangling. The owners, 
through their reserve clause and reverse-order draft of collegiate players, 
squelched competitive bidding for players, thus allowing themselves to 
suppress player salaries. Both of these advantages, territorial protection 
and the suppression of the rights of labor, ran counter to the spirit, if not 
the letter, of U.S. antitrust policies.
 If an owner was in a market where the demand was inadequate, these two 
advantages of price-setting power over ticket prices and superior bargain-
ing power over player salaries might not avail him profitability. Inadequate 
demand might arise if an owner had too much competition (a rival team 
contesting the same territory); an inept set of players and coaches; ticket 
prices that were set too high; an inadequate population base; or if his area 
had insufficient consumer purchasing power.
 The nfl faced competition from the All-America Football Conference 
and the American Football League, whose owners did not respect nfl ter-
ritorial protection. Some nfl owners found themselves with rival teams 
in town, reflecting that western cliché, “This town isn’t big enough for the 
two of us.” The owners in the new leagues increased bidding for the limited 
number of talented players. The nfl owners’ profits were thereby doubly 
squeezed, as their previous advantages became less effective.
 While it is understandable that nfl owners would not welcome aafc 
and afl newcomers with open embraces, there was no reason to approve 
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their tactics in combating the new entrants. Antitrust questions arose, 
so Congress decided to investigate, a backhanded tribute to the league’s 
growing success and popularity.
 Since a key element for an owner’s success rested upon adequate demand, 
owners sought ways to increase demand individually and collectively. To 
boost demand, owners could improve their playing talent, if it didn’t cost 
too much. What was beneficial for one owner might prove injurious to the 
collective interests of all of the owners, so the league implemented rules 
ostensibly designed to curb untoward competition for players. These rules 
pertaining to the reverse-order draft of college players and revenue sharing 
were not as straightforward as fans and pundits believed. nfl owners are 
to be congratulated for successfully cloaking exploitive behavior under the 
guise of “competitive balance” and cooperation.
 Other attempts to increase demand were more benign and benefited 
fans: innovations to distinguish the pro game from the college variety, 
for instance. nfl owners, while resistant to reintegrating the league with 
African American players in the late 1940s and early 1950s, eventually 
tapped into the deep and, initially, cheaper pool of such players. If these 
players incidentally boosted demand for nfl games, so much the better. 
In retrospect, television was a major boost to the demand for nfl games, 
but owners struggled to learn how to effectively harness the new medium.
 Players, too, were beginning to act collectively to improve their situa-
tion. They, of course, hoped to maximize their earnings while improving 
working conditions. During the period covered in this book, they had yet 
to form an effective union, one creating a monopoly of labor.
 The nfl’s past reverberates today. Owner-player strife has long-standing 
precedence; for so many years, owners held the whip hand in dealing with 
players. When players began gaining bargaining parity, owners were seldom 
gracious about the process. Owners may have believed their own myths 
about League Think and cooperation, but their actions continued to betray 
a more accurate depiction of them as a Hydra of conflicting self-interests. 
Owners pursued their self-interest in multiple ways, from moving their 
franchises despite opposition by fellow owners to refusing to share more 
than a pittance of their luxury box revenue. Fans remained loyal despite 
repeated provocation, because the nfl’s product remained so alluring. 
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It was a good thing that nfl games were such an attractive product; the 
games have had to continue to enthrall generations of fans despite the 
exasperating shenanigans of owners and players.
 The nfl’s rise to prosperity was not inevitable, given the league’s 
struggles against the aafc and afl. While the afl mimicked many of 
the aafc’s experiences, the new league had a decisive asset that ensured 
survival: a five-year television contract. The new league’s adroit use of its 
television contract proved an ironic twist. According to most observers of 
the nfl, its owners’ prosperity during the 1950s was due, in large part, to 
their lucrative television arrangements. Many of these same owners had 
initially been suspicious of television.
 Television loomed large in the December 1958 championship game 
between the New York Giants, long a power in the league, and the upstart 
Baltimore Colts. The game has been hailed as, among other things, “The 
Greatest Game Ever Played.” The game was undoubtedly exciting, and it 
was the first overtime in championship play. Millions of Americans watched 
the game, and in the days following the game, it remained a topic of con-
versation. Sportswriter Tex Maule was quick to label it, “The Best Football 
Game Ever Played.” nfl commissioner Bert Bell simply commented, “I 
never saw two clubs with the pitch of desire and inspiration shown by the 
Giants and the Colts. Neither have I ever witnessed such tremendous crowd 
enthusiasm as the fans displayed in the Stadium.”7 Imagine Bell’s pleasure 
upon getting the results from the television returns. Maule’s explanation of 
the game’s significance, though, is of value. “The classics of the pretelevision 
era have been perpetuated only in the minds of the spectators on hand and 
by the newspaper accounts; this, for the first time, was a truly epic game 
which inflamed the imagination of a national audience.”8 This, then, was 
the game’s significance. A generation or two of football fans could say, with 
meaning, “Where were you when Ameche plunged into the end zone?”
 By the 1950s, the nfl was winning its struggle to gain public atten-
tion, not only in league cities but throughout America. The mass media 
of radio and television, along with greater newspaper coverage and the 
introduction of national sports publications, helped to create new legions 
of professional football fans. Pro football, long the ignored stepsibling of 
college football, began to rival, if not surpass, the amateur game. League 
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commissioners Joe Carr and Bert Bell worked diligently to publicize the 
game, but both lacked the promotional ability of later commissioner Pete 
Rozelle; then again, Rozelle had a higher-quality product to peddle than 
did Carr and possibly Bell. According to David Harris, Rozelle eventually 
marketed the game as “an experience.” Michael MacCambridge summed 
up the nfl’s enormous burst of popularity in the late 1950s; “the confluence 
of elements — the Giants’ stature, the ’58 title game, the Packers’ mystique, 
Rozelle’s vision and [Jim] Kensil’s [the league’s publicity man] implementa-
tion of it, the sport’s appeal to Madison Avenue — all contributed to pro 
football moving toward center stage of American sports.”9
 These events are in sharp contrast to the league’s first thirty seasons. 
Early in the league’s history, George Halas was ecstatic to read in a news-
paper “that his Chicago Bears had beaten the Chicago Cardinals for the 
championship of the nfl before a thousand or so diehard fans. It was the 
second sentence, though, which had the Halas heart doing flippity-flops. 
In unexpectedly extravagant language came the critical appraisal: ‘It was a 
very fine game.’ There was no third sentence. That was the entire newspaper 
account.” Halas worked hard, touring “newspaper offices to leave press 
notices — which never were printed — and complimentary tickets — which 
no one wanted — even for free.”10
 By the late 1950s, Major League Baseball was nervously watching the 
nfl’s rise. Branch Rickey, who knew quite a bit about making money 
in baseball and quite a bit about losing money in football, noticed that 
interest in pro football spilled over into the preseason training camps and 
encroached upon baseball’s former monopoly on summertime sports sec-
tions. “Unless we’re on our toes, pro football and pro basketball will pass us 
in both fan interest and at the gate.”11 College football, too, took notice of 
the nfl’s popularity, with Edward “Moose” Krause, Notre Dame athletic 
director, admitting, “Don’t tell me the pros aren’t winning the fans away 
from the college games, because they are. For years the college people 
have been appealing to fans to attend their games out of loyalty. That’s fine. 
But now we have to offer them something more for their entertainment 
dollar.”12
 Perhaps a telltale sign of the nfl’s prosperity was the now-ubiqui-
tous “economic impact” studies used by proponents of publicly financed 
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stadiums. By 1964 nfl owners Art and Dan Rooney and Pete Rozelle could 
claim that the nfl pumped real money into cities. Rozelle
revealed that the Giants, paying the Yankees a percentage rental for 
Yankee Stadium, paid $90,000 in rental “for just one game” — the 1962 
championship game. “You can see,” he went on as a low whistle ran 
over the room, “how football can help pay off your new stadium.” He 
told how pro football can make other businessmen richer. An Atlanta 
study, he said, found that the average out-of-town visitor to a football 
game spends $50 on the weekend. Assuming that half of a capacity 
crowd in Atlanta’s planned 57,000-seat stadium would be from out of 
town, he said, “Visitors would pour $1,425,000 into the bloodstream of 
that community in one weekend.” That was rich enough for Pittsburgh’s 
bloodstream. When Rozelle finished, the businessmen applauded and at 
the table where Art Rooney sat with members of the Stadium Authority, 
there were smiles.13
 Perian (pronounced Perry-Ann) Conerly, who was married to New York 
Giants quarterback George Conerly, wrote newspaper columns about life in 
the nfl. She recalled the changing attitude toward her husband’s work. “It 
concerns tone of voice. ‘Your husband plays professional football?’ has been 
the stock opening line of new acquaintances since our marriage in 1949. It 
remains so in 1960. But the exclamation today bears not a trace of pity.”14
 The postwar period was less sophisticated, which is not to say innocent. 
Perian Conerly recalled Roosevelt Grier’s foray into show business. He 
went on the Dick Clark Show to perform his record release: “Moonlight in 
Vermont” with the flip side “Smoky Morning.”15 No “Super Bowl Shuffle” 
or rap at that time. Grier later costarred in “Daniel Boone” with Fess “Davy 
Crockett” Parker (since Parker sported the same duds, who could tell the 
difference between Davy and Daniel?).
 While Brooklyn priests exhorted their parishes to pray for baseball slug-
ger Gil Hodges during a horrendous slump, the bishop of the “San Francisco 
diocese granted a special dispensation for the Colt Catholics to eat meat 
on Friday evening. ‘I shouldn’t, after what you did to us in Baltimore,’ he 
said gruffly, ‘but I will because I don’t want your boys to collapse after our 
boys whip them.’”16
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 In another example of the ways in which the cultural mores of the 1950s 
and early 1960s differ from those of today, when the Dallas Texans of the 
American Football League took a flight to Buffalo, the flight attendant 
(“stewardess” as they were known then) altered the welcoming remarks: 
“The beautiful blonde and shapely one is me. The other girl is Sherry 
Hansen. My name is Betsy Lockhart and if we can do anything for you like 
holding your hand or sitting on your lap, just let us know. And we both will 
kiss the first one to make a touchdown.” After the game, players and the 
accompanying sportswriters returned to the plane, whereby a sportswriter 
sprinted up the steps and announced he had scored the first touchdown. 
No one knew whether the rightful owner of the two kisses, running back 
Johnny Robinson, witnessed the swindle.17
 Even the United States’ erstwhile foe, the Soviet Union, took note of 
professional football, though it did not join the fans. The Soviet press had 
been pillorying Major League Baseball for its violence and mistreatment of 
blacks. During the early 1950s, the Soviet press addressed American “futbol.” 
According to a New York Times article, the Soviets claimed, “futbol” was
designed to brutalize American youth and prepare it to take its place 
in an “army of bandits and haters of mankind” under the United States’ 
policy of militarization. The newspaper Soviet Sport said that Ameri-
can college “futbol” was one of the chief instruments for inculcating 
American youth in the spirit of “beastly psychology and racist hatred 
for other peoples.” Soviet Sport said that nowhere in American sport was 
achieved such a measure of “racism, corruption, swindling, defrauding 
of the spectators, boorishness and harshness” as on the playing fields 
of American colleges.18
Apparently the Washington Redskins were unknown to the Soviets.
 As the era neared its end, even the nascent counterculture paid attention 
to football. San Francisco 49ers quarterback Y. A. Tittle and his receiver, 
R. C. Owens, devised their “Alley-Oop” pass. The beatniks (forerunners 
of hippies) considered the play “a sort of mystical experience with the ball 
being ‘the center of a focus of unity’ between passer and receiver.”19
 All of the league’s success broke up the tight coterie of owners who had 
struggled to make the league viable. In a telling anecdote, long-time nfl 
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observer, Beano Cook, reflected with Pete Rozelle in 1987: “At one time, a 
handshake was all that was needed in the nfl. Credit the nuns. Most of 
the owners were Catholic. They fought like hell with each other but when a 
deal was made, that was it. A handshake. No lawyers. You know that when 
Art Rooney gave his word, that was it. Same with the Mara brothers. Now 
nobody cares except for a few owners. In many ways, the nfl reminds me 
of the Roman Empire.”20
 Between 1946 and 1960, then, the nfl had been transformed from a 
league with a modest but growing following in the northeast quadrant 
of the nation to an enthralling sport entertaining millions of Americans 
across the nation.
Buy the Book
Buy the Book
11
1
THE USURPERS
The aafc Challenge
nfl owners could congratulate themselves for having survived World 
War II intact, if just barely so. The 1945 championship game garnered the 
top gross gate receipts in the history of the championship with 32,178 fans 
contributing $164,542.1 Although nfl owners claimed chronic losses, the 
pent-up wartime demand for entertainment induced hopes for better days. 
Economic profits or the anticipation of such profits inspire envy, and envy 
triggers entry. The incumbent owners, naturally, were not pleased with the 
prospect of fighting for fans and for players.
 As the war wound down, entrepreneurs began speculating that postwar 
America would be hungry for professional sports entertainment. Many 
leagues and franchises were called; few were profitable. Several prospective 
owners petitioned the nfl for franchises even before the war ended. Major 
League Baseball and professional basketball owners also faced a clamor 
for more teams. The nfl owners found themselves battling a formidable 
challenger in the All-America Football Conference.2
 A rival league was nothing new for the nfl. The league had survived 
challenges from fledgling leagues throughout its existence, with “Cash and 
Carry” Pyle’s American League being a typical example. Pyle and George 
Halas had engineered the lucrative professional debut of Red Grange after 
his spectacular college career. Pyle wanted part ownership of the Bears, but 
Halas refused. In retaliation, Pyle formed his American League, drenching 
all the owners in red ink and bankruptcy. Halas’s team barely survived the 
upheaval.3
 Many writers have chronicled the inception and demise of the aafc. 
Beyond a cursory description of the league’s experience, we shall focus 
on how the nfl battled the new league. Successful companies often face 
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competition, and much of antitrust law concerns the legitimate and ille-
gitimate behavior displayed by incumbents.
The Postwar American Economy
The victorious Americans eagerly looked forward to the end of World War 
II. While some worried that the transition from a wartime to a peacetime 
economy might trigger a relapse into another recession or depression, the 
economy adjusted admirably.
 Gross National Product (gnp) seemed to fall and then rebound between 
1945 and 1947, but when it is adjusted for changes in the price level, the 
real gnp fell in both years. Thereafter, real gnp rose continually except 
for brief, shallow downturns in 1954 and 1958. The general price level rose 
quickly because of the postwar boom in consumer spending and because 
of the relaxation of price controls. By the early 1950s, though, the changes 
in the price level as reflected by the commonly used Consumer Price Index 
(cpi) stabilized. For the period 1952–56, the index was almost stagnant. 
The drop in real gnp in 1946, though, was a reversal of a “good news, bad 
news” joke. The “bad news” was that real gnp dropped (largely because 
of reduced spending on defense), but the good news was that consumers 
spent more. The pent-up demand for leisure and consumption began to 
be satisfied in 1946. Nominal and real spending on spectator recreation 
jumped in 1946. Motion pictures enjoyed prosperity in 1946 as well. Real 
spending on sports experienced a burst of enthusiasm in the late 1940s 
before lapsing into stagnation. Americans began switching from public to 
private forms of recreation expenditures. Instead of going out to movies 
and ballgames, Americans chose to remain at home watching television 
or watching their children play. The demographic changes wrought by the 
baby boom reduced the number of young single men and women. Reflect-
ing this family emphasis, the only part of the movie industry that did well 
was the drive-in sector.4
 Americans purchased automobiles and houses in suburbs in greater num-
bers. The automobiles gave them mobility and made living in the suburbs 
more feasible. The growing distance between middle- and upper-middle-
class homes and the downtown areas, where many ballparks were located, 
created a demand for easy freeway access and convenient parking once 
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suburbanites reached the ballpark. The migration of African Americans to 
northern cities continued after the war, too, changing the racial makeup 
of many cities. Table 1 shows characteristics of the cities with National 
Football League teams in 1950, as well as some later nfl locations. These 
cities typically had smsa (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area) median 
incomes above the national average, so their residents should have been 
better able to afford tickets to professional sporting events.
The aafc’s Birth
When the nfl rebuffed several prospective owners’ applications, Arch 
Ward, Chicago Tribune sportswriter (and later sports editor), encouraged the 
prospective owners to form a new league. Because of the wartime-imposed 
limits on many entertainment options, there was a great yearning for enter-
tainment just waiting for the war to end before cascading throughout the 
industry. Because the war had disrupted the normal transition of players 
from college to pro careers, there was also a backlog of talent available. 
Many players, even former nfl players, had ambiguous contractual sta-
tus. Bert Bell denied that these players were free agents.5 Owners could 
also hope that the hike in college attendance caused by the gi Bill would 
improve the quality and quantity of college talent graduating in the years 
to come. A visionary such as Paul Brown could quickly build a powerful 
team from the pool of available players. The new league, indeed, hoped to 
avoid a bidding war with the nfl over players. They also hoped to stage 
a game between the champions of the two leagues that would be akin to 
baseball’s World Series.6 Sports historian Michael MacCambridge believes 
the nfl’s decision to continue operations during the war proved a key ele-
ment in its struggle against the aafc, giving the older league the necessary 
continuity and tradition.7
 By early 1945 aafc owners were hiring coaches and signing players 
in anticipation of debuting in the fall of 1946.8 They also sought stadium 
leases.9
 aafc owners were, in many cases, wealthier than their nfl counter-
parts. Hollywood stalwarts Bing Crosby, Louis B. Mayer, and Don Ameche 
(no relation to the Colts’ Alan Ameche) owned the Los Angeles Dons.10 
They attempted to get Bert Bell to form a franchise, and Bell admitted he 
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was tempted. George Halas convinced him that the nfl would make him 
commissioner, so Bell stayed with that league and became an implacable 
foe of the aafc. aafc commissioner James Crowley, a member of Notre 
Dame’s famed “Four Horsemen,” later released information about Bell’s 
interest in owning an aafc team.11
 As with their nfl peers, aafc owners did not own stadiums. While 
most Major League Baseball teams owned stadiums and could legitimately 
deny the use of such facilities to potential rivals, nfl owners could not be 
certain their landlords wouldn’t lease stadiums to new teams. The aafc 
had access to several large stadiums, and Arch Ward later boasted that 
aafc teams played in stadiums with a larger combined capacity than did 
the nfl teams.12
 The aafc exposed some fissures in the nfl’s structure. Cleveland 
Rams owner Dan Reeves was perturbed that his 1945 championship team 
lost money overall. He was eyeing the burgeoning Los Angeles market 
for his team. Dan Topping, owner of a dormant Brooklyn franchise that 
was temporarily merged with Ted Collins’s Boston club, was chafing at his 
inability to field his team in his Yankee Stadium, as he was the sole nfl 
owner who owned a stadium.13
 The nfl owners’ initial response to the aafc’s announcement of its 
intention to play in 1946 was ridicule. Outgoing nfl commissioner, Elmer 
Layden, another of Notre Dame’s “Four Horsemen,” perhaps viewing the 
aafc as akin to the patsies that his Notre Dame team used to play, retorted, 
“New league? Why they haven’t even got a football.”14
 Unfortunately for Layden’s prescience, the aafc may not have had their 
footballs yet, but they scored a huge publicity coup when disgruntled Dan 
Topping dropped his team in the nfl to field a new one in the upstart 
league. Even though the Giants’ owners, the Maras, had finally acquiesced to 
his playing in the Stadium, Topping claimed dissatisfaction with the playing 
dates assigned to him.15 Topping announced that his new team, the cleverly 
named Yankees, would play in Yankee Stadium. Because Topping owned 
the stadium with his baseball partners Larry MacPhail and Del Webb, the 
team would earn concessions revenue. Topping gladly paid the $50,000 
aafc membership fee, although some reporters thought that the other 
aafc members enticed him with cash contributions. These owners knew 
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that having a franchise in New York City gave their league credibility, as 
aafc commissioner Jim Crowley stated: “We were ready to go, anyway, 
and I think we would have done very well, but getting New York in the 
league certainly has boosted our stock. . . . Several of our people right now 
could sell their franchises for considerably more than they paid for them.”16 
Topping ungraciously blasted the nfl upon his departure: “[The nfl] is 
no league at all, it is a racket. I ought to know, I was one of the 6 stooges 
for the big 4 until I got some brains and pulled out.”17
 The remaining nfl owners derided Topping for being a poor owner who 
lost considerable money in operating the Brooklyn franchise. Topping’s 
defection left nfl owners reeling. Some observers believed that Ted Col-
lins, owner of the Boston Yanks, might join him in the new league. In the 
meantime, Topping’s defection left the fate of the Brooklyn team in limbo; 
eventually the Boston and Brooklyn teams merged and remained in Boston 
for the time being.18 George Preston Marshall, owner of the Washington 
Redskins, actually thought it a good thing that Topping switched leagues, 
as it clarified the nfl’s “New York problem.” Marshall also sounded con-
ciliatory about the aafc: “If the other league proves itself, there is that 
possibility [of a championship between leagues]. If the All-American [sic] 
Conference is a sound success it will help professional football all around. 
If it is a failure, it will not hurt anybody but them.”19
 Topping’s defection solved a pressing problem for the aafc, as his 
became the eighth team in the league, making scheduling easier. Baltimore 
had originally been granted a franchise but could not get organized in time 
for the 1946 season. The league set up a fourteen-game schedule, with each 
team playing a home-and-home set with every other rival, unlike the nfl 
and its lopsided schedule in which teams fought over the opportunity to 
play the Bears and the Giants.20 Because landing a New York franchise was 
imperative for the aafc, Topping’s new compatriots not only provided 
financial inducements but also allowed him the right to select one player 
from each team, exclusive of the top three men named by each club. In 
return Topping shared the hundreds of players on the reserve list of his 
old Brooklyn club.21
 aafc owners immediately challenged nfl teams to exhibition games. 
nfl owners recognized the danger of playing even exhibition games 
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with the upstarts. As John McGraw of baseball’s New York Giants real-
ized in 1904, playing a championship series with an American League 
team only served to strengthen the upstarts while possibly damaging the 
entrenched league. The nfl owners declined such invitations and passed 
a rule prohibiting their teams from playing exhibition games against any 
other circuits, aside from one of their own minor league allies, without the 
consent of four-fifths of the league membership. The aafc made repeated 
invitations to the nfl for exhibition or championship games between 
the leagues, occasionally even trying to embarrass the older circuit into 
accepting. Later Commissioner Jonas Ingram wired Bell, while releasing 
the contents of the telegram to reporters before Bell received it: “Since no 
valid reason has been advanced for the refusal of the National Football 
League to accept our challenge of Aug. 25 [1947] to a world championship 
game between your champion and the All-America Football Conference 
champion, the only conclusion we can draw is that you feel your cham-
pion would be unable to defeat ours, or that you feel the All-America 
Conference is not well established as a major league. In answer to your 
first assumption, we hereby offer to play our second-place team against 
your champion.”22
 With Layden’s quips about “owning a football” ringing in their ears, the 
aafc owners decided that they needed to raid nfl rosters for players. 
Commissioner Jim Crowley told reporters, “We originally resolved not to 
tamper with National League players, but since the nfl snubbed us we 
can see no reason why we can’t hire their players.” At the time, the aafc 
had 150 players under contract but only 4 were former nfl players.23
 As the 1945 nfl season wound down, aafc owners began their raiding 
in earnest. The Chicago Bears lost Edgar (Special Delivery) Jones to the 
Cleveland Browns. Jones signed a contract to play the 1946 season with 
the Browns, but he was under contract with the Bears for 1945. The Bears 
had surreptitiously signed Jones away from the Pacific Coast [Football] 
League’s San Francisco Clippers, who had signed him to play for $500 a 
game.24 While the anonymous reporter called Jones a “surprise backfield 
star,” he had only appeared in one game with the Bears before nfl com-
missioner Elmer Layden ruled that he was suspended for the 1945 season. 
Cleveland owner Arthur McBride mocked Layden, saying, “Mr. Layden 
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knows now that if we haven’t got a football we at least have a player the 
National League would very much like to have.”25 aafc owners attempted 
to entice long-time nfl quarterbacks Frank Filchock and Sid Luckman to 
defect, but without luck. Luckman admitted, “They [aafc owners] have 
been hounding me for the last several weeks, and their offers have been 
fabulous.”26 Sportswriter Arch Ward wrote that, “In the All-America, these 
skyscraper checks certainly weren’t out of line. The conference teams had 
to make a big splash quickly, and signing fabulous players was the most 
effective means to establish a following.”27
 nfl owners faced two disadvantages in battling interlopers. Major 
League Baseball had tight control over thousands of players, whom they 
could threaten with such reprisals as blacklisting. Because the nfl had 
few minor league affiliations, individual teams did not control hundreds of 
players.28 An upstart football league could also gain instant credibility by 
signing top college prospects. It was easier to induce these highly publicized 
football players to sign contracts with a new league, whereas established 
baseball owners didn’t have to worry much about a new league reaping 
much publicity by signing college All-American baseball players.
The Fight for Players
Because player salaries stagnated during World War II in real terms 
(adjusted for changes in the price level), player salaries were very low. The 
Philadelphia Eagles and Cleveland Rams claimed that their payrolls were 
$123,500 and $128,000 respectively. The Rams claimed that the $128,000 
payroll was 25 percent higher than any previous payroll, and they expected 
to pay $190,000 in salaries for 1946. Sportswriter Stanley Frank reported 
that team payrolls were remarkably similar across teams, quoting Elmer 
Layden’s survey showing a spread of only $19,000 across teams in 1941. 
The last-place Chicago Cardinals allegedly paid their thirty-three players a 
combined $45,000 that season.29 Bert Bell told reporters that aafc com-
petition raised nfl team payrolls by an average of $100,000 per season. 
The aafc owners could offer hefty percentage increases in the nominal 
salaries and still pay players less in purchasing power (real salaries) than 
they earned in 1941. Between 1941 and 1946, the Consumer Price Index 
rose by roughly 33 percent. The index rose another 23 percent by 1950.30 
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Although the salary increases seemed dramatic, they can easily be exag-
gerated unless adjusted in real terms.
 aafc teams quickly signed such nfl standouts as the Chicago Bears’ 
Norm Standlee, Lee Artoe, Ace Parker, and Parker Hall. These signings 
helped bolster the new league in the public’s opinion.31 The raiding even 
included a coach; Washington Redskins coach Dudley Sargent DeGroot 
signed with renegade owner Dan Topping. DeGroot had coached the Red-
skins to an Eastern Conference title.32 Historian Craig Coenen believes 
that the aafc owners used their deep pockets to obtain their fair share 
of collegiate talent to go with the dozens of former nfl players they had 
signed.33
 Desperate to stanch the flow of players to the aafc, the nfl owners, 
along with their minor league allies (the Pacific Coast [Football] League 
and the Dixie League), reiterated their five-year ban from organized football 
(thus implying that the aafc was “unorganized football”) for any players 
who played for the aafc. The owners cleverly interpreted the ban to be 
effective not upon signing a contract with the aafc but upon actually 
appearing in a game, thereby allowing erring players to return to the friendly 
embrace of the nfl.34 aafc commissioner James Crowley warned aafc 
players not to be duped by nfl salary offers designed to entice them back 
into the fold. Crowley claimed, “These offers sound fine on the surface, but 
most of them carry a clause which makes them cancelable on forty-eight 
hours’ notice.”35 Commissioner Bell lifted the suspension of players banned 
for breach of their contract or their option clause in November 1949; his 
action may have been prompted by the William Radovich case.36
 Both leagues began cloak-and-dagger operations, relying on secrecy to 
protect their chances of signing talented collegians. The aafc proposed 
a “secret” draft. The owners tweaked the nfl by claiming their draft was 
superior to the nfl one. The aafc owners planned to solicit information 
from college coaches as to which of their players would be interested in 
pursuing a professional career. An aafc coach, Brooklyn’s Mal Stevens, 
told reporters, “There’s no sense in publicizing a list of players who have 
no intention of entering the professional field. The National League has 
conducted this draft system mainly to advance its own game by flaunting 
names of college stars before the public eye.”37 The nfl held its draft on 
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January 11, but withheld the names of the players. The owners continued 
hold secret drafts throughout the duration of the interleague strife.38
 While football owners could count on losing thousands of dollars in the 
internecine struggle, they might have remembered that only the lawyers 
are certain winners in such disputes. When the nfl Boston Yanks decided 
to retaliate for the aafc’s raids by pursuing and signing Notre Dame 
quarterback Angelo Bertelli, the Los Angeles Dons quickly filed a lawsuit, 
just one of many filed by football owners during the aafc-nfl struggle 
for players. The case drew interest because the Yanks claimed the Dons 
used underhanded tactics to sign the youngster. Bertelli himself claimed 
the aafc team used “fraud and misrepresentation” when inducing him to 
sign the contract. He alleged that the Dons’ agent did not divulge whom 
he represented (yet he signed the contract anyway). The Dons argued that 
Bertelli was a “unique” talent who was comparable to Sammy Baugh and 
Sid Luckman, and that he was irreplaceable, while the Yanks were put in 
the odd position of stating he was “just another outstanding passer.” The 
Dons argued that they had given Bertelli $1,000 to sign the $10,000-a-year 
contract while he was still in the Marine Corps. Bertelli admitted signing 
the contract but returned the bonus before signing with the Boston Yanks. 
The court ruled that Bertelli had to play with the Dons. Rather than prolong 
the legal proceedings, Collins assented to the court’s decision and encour-
aged Bertelli to play for the Dons. Under those strained circumstances, 
Bertelli played one full season with the Dons before playing three games 
with the Chicago Rockets.39
 Both leagues considered setting up affiliations with professional teams 
in smaller cities. On occasion, nfl owners had discussed creating minor 
league systems similar to baseball’s. Given the ephemeral nature of the 
postwar boom in spectator sports, it was just as well that they didn’t invest 
too much in such teams. The owners’ real purpose was to stash their redun-
dant players without exposing them to teams in the opposing league.40
 The legal threats and counterthreats occasionally led to bizarre rumors. 
The Cleveland Browns signed fullback Gaylon Smith and tackle Chet 
Adams, formerly of the Los Angeles Rams. At one point, a rumor circulated 
that the Browns would send Ted Fritsch back to Green Bay provided the 
Rams didn’t sue over Adams and Smith. The Packers would send a “name” 
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player to the Rams. Not only was the “player to be named later for a lawsuit 
to be dropped” novel, it was an interleague trade, something that Bert Bell 
quickly said was “absolutely out of the question.”41 Fritsch rejoined the 
Packers after telling the Browns he didn’t want to play for them (maybe he 
saw how good Marion Motley was). The lawsuit over Chet Adams ended 
in the Browns’ favor, although the judge’s legal reasoning was of interest. 
Judge Emerich B. Freed “ruled the Cleveland Rams had ceased to exist as of 
the date of the transfer of their franchise to Los Angeles and that Adams’s 
obligations under the contract became impossible of performance.”42 If his 
interpretation was correct, the ruling should have send shudders down the 
spine of any owner considering relocation, as it threatened to grant free 
agency to all of his players.
 Major League Baseball owners watched pro football’s turmoil with inter-
est. Some baseball owners stood to benefit from the new league, as they 
rented their stadiums to the new teams.43 Baseball owners, though, wor-
ried about the potential court challenges to clauses in player contracts, 
especially the reserve clause.
Other Fields of Struggle
At the nfl meetings, the owners ousted Elmer Layden and installed Bert 
Bell as commissioner.44 Part of the nfl owners’ rationale for ousting Layden 
was their desire to get a hard-boiled leader. Bell might have seemed an 
anomalous choice, given his earlier flirtation with the aafc, but he imme-
diately denied that the league was interested in cooperating with the aafc: 
“I’ve got no time to worry about the All-America Conference or any other 
league.”45 The nfl owners were not interested in sharing their hard-won 
glimmer of prosperity with a bunch of nouveau-riche owners.
 Some sportswriters believed the aafc had a good chance of succeeding 
and cited the league’s careful preparation. nfl owners had traditionally 
pled poverty. As a way to discourage potential entrants, such a strategy 
of modesty made sense, but it didn’t work. Sportswriter Stanley Frank 
disputed the nfl’s sob stories about losses, writing, “It was inevitable that 
a second league would make a play for the swollen profits in pro football, 
given greater allure by the current sports boom.” He repeated the aafc 
owners’ claim that they were willing to lose $300,000 over the first three 
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years as evidence of their determination.46 The aafc owners attempted 
to ensure that talent was somewhat evenly distributed. The owners also 
proved visionary in negotiating a $250,000 travel deal with United Air 
Lines.47
 The nfl had several weapons at its disposal. The established league could 
use its schedule to hamper aafc efforts. Bert Bell, nfl schedule maker 
by default, could arrange to give New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles the 
most attractive home dates in order to encroach upon rival aafc teams’ 
attendance in those cities. Since the nfl never had balanced schedules, its 
owners easily acquiesced to the gerrymandered scheduling. The New York 
Giants got seven home games in their eleven-game schedule, including 
three on the same Sundays as the aafc New York Yankees and another 
pair of games on the same weekend (the Yankees sometimes played on 
Saturday). In a show of bravado, Tom Gallery, Yankees official, chortled, 
“We will play in direct competition with the Giants, Sunday for Sunday. 
Let the fans decide which teams they want to see.” Unfortunately for the 
Yankees, the Giants drew over 190,000 fans versus the Yankees’ 101,000 
during the four weekends; both teams won their divisions.48 The Chicago 
Bears got six home games, while the Chicago Cardinals, perennial sec-
ond bananas of the Windy City, received just four home games. The Los 
Angeles Rams only got five home games.49 The nfl used its established 
publicity contacts, and the league’s publicity director, George Strickler, 
urged team public relations men to cooperate fully with media personnel 
at an April meeting. Some owners groused at the aafc’s publicity suc-
cesses. George Halas told his fellow owners that the Chicago newspapers 
and Associated Press favored the aafc Chicago Rockets over the nfl 
teams in the city.50
 At least Dan Reeves’s transfer of his Rams to Los Angeles gave the nfl 
a chance to compete for the lucrative Southern California market. There 
was an existing professional team, the Hollywood Bears, competing for 
playing dates at the Los Angeles Coliseum. If one of the leagues had gotten 
first choice of desirable playing dates, they might have been able to cripple 
the other Los Angeles rival. The Rams struck first, signing a three-year 
contract calling for a rental price of 15 percent of the gate plus a $6,500 per 
game cleanup fee. The Coliseum commission had yet to decide whether to 
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accept the application of the aafc’s Los Angeles Dons. The commission 
ruled that only six professional games could be played between the last 
week of September and the first week of December. The Rams got five of 
the dates, which essentially froze the Dons out of the Coliseum. The Coli-
seum Commission claimed its decision to allow just one pro team use the 
facility was based on its concerns for the University of Southern California 
and the University of California, Los Angeles football programs. Before 
nfl owners could congratulate themselves, the Dons’ owners, Hollywood 
big shots with political clout, began to fight back. They eventually got five 
playing dates at the Coliseum without having to fall back to using Gilmore 
Stadium (with a limited seating capacity of twenty-five thousand) or the 
Rose Bowl. In the event, the Dons might as well have played in Gilmore 
Stadium, since the club, even with a winning record, was hard pressed to 
attract thirty thousand fans for any of their games.51
The aafc Debuts
The aafc opened play on Friday, September 6, 1946, when the Cleveland 
Browns shellacked the Miami Seahawks 44–0 in Cleveland before sixty 
thousand fans. The game proved a harbinger of sorts, as the Browns ran 
off seven wins in a row before losing back-to-back games against the Cali-
fornia teams. The Browns became the league’s marquee team and garnered 
national publicity. Paul Brown was hailed as a genius, and nfl owners 
may have privately been glad they didn’t have to send their best club, 
the Chicago Bears, to do battle against the Browns. The Browns’ last two 
regular-season games against the Seahawks and Dodgers demonstrated 
the league’s weakness: the combined total attendance for the two games 
was less than twenty-four thousand.52
 Despite the lopsided results, Newsweek reported that the league ended 
its first season in “fairly good shape. Only three of its teams probably 
will make money — the Cleveland Browns, the New York Yankees, and 
the San Francisco Forty-Niners — but except for the badly clipped Miami 
Seahawks, the others are by no means breaking their backers’ bankrolls.”53 
The Seahawks, in fact, were in dire straits. James Crowley reported that the 
team’s owners had not met the league’s “indebtedness clause,” and that the 
league had to cover the last two months’ payroll. The Seahawks owners failed 
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to post the $100,000 guarantee. A week later, the league awarded (actually 
reawarded) a franchise to Baltimore. The terms included Baltimore paying 
$100,000 and posting a $250,000 guarantee.54 The Brooklyn Dodgers were 
losing money rapidly, despite having a natural rivalry with the New York 
Yankees. Reporters estimated that the Dodgers lost $250,000 in 1946.55 The 
league’s championship game between the Cleveland Browns and New York 
Yankees in Cleveland was not as lucrative as hoped, perhaps because the 
Browns were 13.5-point favorites. The nfl Championship Game between 
the Giants and Chicago Bears pulled in fifty-eight thousand fans, some 
seventeen thousand more than the aafc game. The Browns, apparently 
confident of their ability, had challenged the eventual nfl champions to 
a game, but Bert Bell push the kibosh on the idea, arrogantly stating, “The 
winner of [our] game is the only world champion that we recognize.” Bell 
didn’t sense the irony of how small the nfl “world” was.56
 Arch Ward, one of the visionaries who inspired the aafc’s founding, 
boasted that the league’s inaugural season was a “tremendous show,” espe-
cially in comparison the nfl’s history of franchise instability.57 The aafc 
owners anticipated losses in 1946, and he claimed that they had expected 
$100,000 losses per season for each team for the first three seasons. He 
thought Cleveland, New York, and San Francisco actually made money in 
1946, with the Browns being able to pay coach Paul Brown over $50,000 
for his efforts.58
 While the aafc got off to a reasonable start, its best hopes for survival 
were to reach an accommodation with the nfl and to somehow improve 
its weak teams. Replacing Miami with Baltimore did not improve com-
petitive balance, but the Baltimore fans appeared more enthusiastic than 
those in Miami. The nfl owners, some of whom had precarious finances, 
maintained a solid front of opposition to any agreement with the aafc, 
but neutral observers believed professional football would be best served 
by a setup similar to Major League Baseball. One writer said the inter-
league struggle was eroding player discipline: “If you don’t like what I [a 
disgruntled player] am doing, you can be saved the trouble from now on, 
because I am going to the other league.”59 aafc commissioner Jim Crowley 
stated that he approached Bert Bell regarding a meeting to hammer out 
an agreement for both leagues to respect each other’s player contracts, but 
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Bell denied this. He might have been encouraged to do so by rumors that 
some aafc signees were reconsidering and wanted to return to the nfl.60
The Protracted Struggle
Some nfl teams were struggling, and there were reports that Art Rooney 
was peddling the Pittsburgh Steelers. Since many teams were doing poorly 
on the ledgers, peace rumors flourished.61
 But peace was not at hand, and team owners resumed competing for 
players. The nfl began raiding aafc rosters, although not always success-
fully. Both sets of owners eyed Army’s duo of running backs, Glenn Davis 
and Doc Blanchard, especially when rumors floated that the Army might 
allow the two players four-month leaves to play football. The aafc, recog-
nizing the publicity coup of signing the players, encouraged the Brooklyn 
Dodgers to trade their draft rights to Blanchard to San Francisco, which 
already had rights to Davis. The aafc’s machinations were futile, as the 
secretary of war denied the football players’ applications for leaves.62
 During the aafc’s second season, when reported attendance remained 
stable across the league and actually increased for some teams, some nfl 
owners took to disputing the upstart league’s attendance figures. Baseball 
owners were notorious for issuing exaggerated attendance figures when 
competing with rival leagues. Tim Mara of the New York Giants called 
the aafc “the biggest flop in American sports promotions.” He claimed 
that the receipts of a Yankees-Browns game at Yankee Stadium would 
fall far short of the $70,000 predicted. Maher and Gill list the November 
23, 1947 game between the two teams as having 70,060 in attendance.63 
Such a crowd would almost completely fill Yankee Stadium. Experienced 
sportswriters should have been able to ascertain whether the announced 
attendance was grossly inflated, although, of course, they lacked the ability 
to gauge how many fans attended with complimentary tickets.
 Although most of the aafc teams were stabilizing during 1947–48, 
the Chicago Rockets continued to limp along. The franchise was inept on 
the field and had trouble getting over five thousand people to attend for 
some of their games against other lackluster aafc teams. The Internal 
Revenue Department was unhappy with the Rockets, too, as the team’s 
unpaid withholding taxes alone reached $25,596. The league eventually 
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assumed ownership of the franchise and began looking for new owners.64 
The Rockets’ prospects were not helped by the Cardinals’ brief period as 
a contending team in the nfl.65
 By the end of the 1947 season, sportswriter Ed Prell wrote, “The All-
America Football Conference . . . definitely has carved out a permanent 
place of itself in major league sports.” Prell believed six of the teams were 
close to breaking even or making a profit, although Brooklyn and Chicago 
were obvious weak links. The league had a total attendance of two million 
for exhibition, regular-season, and championship games, although some 
or even many of these may have been attendees with complimentary tick-
ets. The league’s ability to generate crowds in excess of fifty thousand was 
impressive, though. Prell thought the Los Angeles Dons and New York 
Yankees were enjoying larger crowds than their nfl rivals in those cities.66 
Commissioner Admiral Jonas Ingram confirmed that Brooklyn was in 
good standing and that Branch Rickey was willing to take over if the cur-
rent owners so desired. Rickey did, indeed, step in; he took over the team 
in January 1948, without responsibility for the team’s indebtedness. Ingram 
also expressed hope that new ownership would take over the Chicago Rock-
ets. A few months later, the league took over the Baltimore Colts when the 
club’s president admitted the team did not have sufficient funds to guarantee 
operation for 1948 despite relatively healthy gates in 1947. Sufficient funding 
was found to maintain Baltimore, and the team was able to participate in 
raiding nfl rosters by signing a New York Giants running back.67
 Rickey did show initiative in his ardent pursuit of University of Missis-
sippi quarterback Charlie Conerly: “I offered the boy more than a $20,000 
bonus, and a four-year contract at $20,000 per year. I never offered any 
baseball player that kind of money.” Rickey admitted that he may have 
overbid for Conerly. Despite his lavish wooing, Rickey lost out to the New 
York Giants, who offered much less money. Rickey, always cash-conscious, 
was bemused by Conerly’s decision.68 The Giants were desperate for a 
quarterback after the suspension of Frank Filchock, and sent halfback 
Howie Livingston and an unnamed player to the Washington Redskins for 
draft rights to Conerly. While Conerly never achieved All-nfl status, he 
was a mainstay in the team’s resurgence. Livingston became a journeyman 
running back.69
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 The aafc and nfl manipulated their college drafts again in 1947. 
The aafc tried to redress the competitive imbalance by having its top 
teams participate in the first round and then defer drafting for most of the 
remainder of the first ten rounds. The championship game participants, the 
Browns and the Yankees, only took four selections each in the ten rounds. 
The usual secrecy pervaded the draft. The nfl, meanwhile, had its plans 
for an early draft postponed because of a playoff game between the Eagles 
and Steelers.70 The aafc’s efforts may have contributed to the Baltimore 
Colts’ improved record in 1948, but Chicago and Brooklyn continued to 
languish despite additional reinforcement in the form of twenty players 
transferred from stronger teams to the three struggling clubs. Commissioner 
Ingram lauded the contributing clubs: “The determination and unselfish 
cooperation of the representatives of the various clubs during the meeting 
was impressive.”71
 Shirley Povich wrote that while the Baltimore Colts were avidly seeking 
quarterback Bobby Layne, many of their compatriots were not going into 
the player market with “much enthusiasm.” In a volte-face, Admiral Ingram 
chided wealthier aafc teams for not doing more to help Baltimore and 
Brooklyn with players. The admiral became petulant and exclaimed, “They 
can get a new commissioner if they don’t adopt some of my suggestions for 
the good of the league. So far the temptation to load up with all the talent 
they can get and turn nothing loose to a weaker club has been too great 
for some of our owners. I thought I was working with smarter people.”72
 Sportswriter Herman Goldstein reported signs of improved competitive 
balance, based mostly on Baltimore’s improvement, but Ingram’s complaint 
about competitive imbalance was accurate. The Brooklyn and Chicago 
clubs had three wins between them, while Cleveland and San Francisco 
won twenty-six of twenty-eight games. None of the other clubs had win-
ning records.73
Peace Feelers
At the end of the 1948 season, owners renewed interest in a settlement. 
While nfl stalwarts George Halas, George Preston Marshall, and Tim 
Mara remained staunch foes of conciliation, some of their peers began 
to waver. Philadelphia Eagles owner Alexis (Les) Thompson told Sport 
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magazine writer Al Stump, “We’ll either get smart and make peace with the 
All-America Conference — or we’ll all go bust.” Stump observed that the 
two leagues’ rivalry benefited football fans and players, as it meant more 
games and higher pay. He worried, though, that those gentlemen funding 
the party had little patience and had dwindling wherewithal with which 
to continue. Thompson pointed out that San Francisco 49ers owner Tony 
Morabito averaged thirty-five thousand in attendance and still lost almost 
$150,000 in two years (left unsaid was how Thompson knew how well or 
how poorly an owner in the rival league was doing). Thompson said he 
purchased the Eagles in 1940, and the team sold seventy-one season tickets 
and attracted fewer than five thousand people per game that season.74 He 
claimed that frugality limited his loss that season to $50,000. In 1947 the 
Eagles had a title-winning team that sold twenty thousand season tickets 
and averaged thirty thousand per game in attendance, but “the final figures 
showed an even greater deficit than in 1941!”75 (italics in original) Thompson 
claimed that only the Bears, Giants, Redskins, and Browns earned profits in 
1947. Aside from the issue of two teams competing in the same city (such 
as in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago), the key issue revolved around 
a common draft. Thompson said he proposed such a draft, but none of the 
other nfl owners would even second his motion.76
 Thompson halted his peace-seeking efforts when, at a meeting between 
owners of each league held in his office, Dan Topping loudly proclaimed 
that the Giants stood to lose $200,000 during the season, a statement that 
enraged the Giants and Thompson. nfl owners may have felt embold-
ened by rumors that Paul Brown was considering resigning as coach of 
the Cleveland Browns. They interpreted this rumor as an indication of 
Brown’s loss of faith in the league.77 Another swirling rumor, contradictory 
to the previous one, claimed that the nfl would admit Cleveland and San 
Francisco while allowing the Boston Yanks to move to New York. Obvi-
ously such a move required the approval of the Giants’ Maras. As rumors 
go, this one was actually prescient of the final outcome.78
 A few months later, Thompson renewed his efforts to promote peace: 
“I’d be a fool, if I didn’t try and resolve a situation in which most of us are 
losing money [a reported $32,000 in 1947].” His proposal again revolved 
around a common draft pool, but George Preston Marshall was having 
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nothing to do with the plan. In a revealing statement, Marshall thundered, 
“But less than a third of our budget goes to players’ salaries. Cutting them 
won’t solve the problem. The real trouble . . . is simple: not enough people 
will pay enough money to see pro football.”79 The interesting aspect of 
Thompson’s efforts was his claim of having lost $32,000 while playing 
in an uncontested market and winning a championship. Thompson was 
reputedly wealthier than many of the owners, so a $32,000 loss shouldn’t 
have threatened his solvency. Surely he could have outlasted the flagging 
aafc. Conversely, those nfl owners without a championship team and 
without deep pockets may well have been losing greater sums and may 
have been becoming fatigued.
 There were signs that the aafc owners were flagging. A Cleveland 
Browns official admitted that the Chicago Rockets required a $300,000 
infusion of cash from Cleveland, New York, and Los Angeles in order to 
finish the 1948 season.80 Despite this admission, the aafc declared it would 
operate with eight teams in 1949. Los Angeles Dons owner Benjamin F. 
Lindheimer reported that league attendance fell by 5.4 percent between 1947 
and 1948 but claimed this was “less than the average drop for sports and 
amusement industry as a whole.”81 A group of Dallas investors expressed 
interest in fielding a team if the Chicago Rockets folded. To guard against 
teams becoming bankrupt at midseason, aafc officials required evidence 
that each team had at least $200,000 in “free and unpledged cash.”82
 Sportswriter Jimmy Powers, though, believed until late 1949 that the 
aafc was viable and excoriated Tim Mara’s refusal to settle with the 
upstarts.83 Bert Bell said there was “no truce” between the two leagues, 
but on the next day he announced that the two groups of owners would 
meet. Alexis Thompson still advocated peace, and this time George Halas 
joined in by calling for a “sensible solution.”84 The meeting between aafc 
commissioner Jonas Ingram, an aafc committee, and the nfl officials 
foundered on the fate of the Baltimore and Buffalo teams. Both teams 
refused to go quietly into football oblivion. The nfl indicated it would 
accept only Cleveland and San Francisco. One can imagine that nfl owners 
coveted the San Francisco franchise as a traveling partner to the Los Ange-
les Rams, and the Browns’ status as a premier team made them attractive. 
nfl owner Ted Collins wanted to relocate his franchise to New York and 
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play in Yankee Stadium (presumably after merging ownership with Dan 
Topping). Other aafc owners hoped to buy partial ownership in nfl 
teams. Brooklyn was not involved; as the franchise had lost heavily, it was 
not attractive to the nfl.85 Sportswriter Dan Daniel attributed the failure 
of negotiations both to Tim Mara’s antipathy toward Dan Topping and to 
George Preston Marshall’s refusal to countenance a franchise in Baltimore, 
which he considered a violation of his territorial rights. Marshall reputedly 
shouted, “There can be no peace as long as Baltimore remains.” Marshall 
also implied that he couldn’t understand how Tim Mara could consider 
letting the Boston team play in New York.86
 Because peace promised financial relief, if not prosperity, both sets of 
owners continued to meet. The owners continued to pursue their individual 
self-interest as the spirited bidding for collegiate talent erupted again. Some 
observers felt that even if a complete accord could not be reached, a truce 
involving a common player draft would be an astute move.87
 Dan Topping reiterated his plans to have professional football at Yan-
kee Stadium in 1949, whether it was his Yankees team or another team, 
presumably the Boston Yanks. In the intertwined world of professional 
sports, Horace Stoneham, who was the landlord of the football New York 
Giants and the president of the baseball New York Giants, was encouraging 
Topping to resolve the strife, as he felt having three football teams in the 
city was one team too many. Both Topping and Chicago Rockets president 
R. E. Garn indicated that they would either fold or remain in the league, 
whichever would best serve their fellow aafc owners. The Mara brothers 
agreed to let Ted Collins move his Boston Yanks to New York and play 
either in Yankee Stadium or at the Polo Grounds. Branch Rickey and his 
football Brooklyn Dodgers were an unknown factor. Rickey had failed to 
replicate his baseball success in Brooklyn with the pigskin Dodgers and 
was bleeding money.88
 Scheduling difficulties had precluded an earlier attempt by a team to 
share New York City with the Giants. Brooklyn Tigers owner Arthur Fried-
lund had offered the Giants $250,000 to share the city by playing in Yankee 
Stadium. Because the baseball Yankees did not permit nfl games until 
the baseball season was over, the Tigers’ proposal was not feasible.89
 While these negotiations were taking place, Eagles owner Alexis 
Buy the Book
30 The Usurpers
Thompson was fielding offers to sell his team. He wanted $250,000 and 
was dealing with a group of sixty buyers headed by Jim Clark, a Philadelphia 
politician.90
 Rumors of peace persisted throughout January 1949. The eventual solu-
tion that was adopted after the 1949 season was essentially agreed upon, 
but the Baltimore-Washington situation remained unresolved, as did the 
turmoil in New York City. Eventually, the Brooklyn Dodgers merged with 
the New York Yankees (how jarring those headlines must have seemed; 
a Dodger-Yankee is redolent of that staple of the 1950s B movie, a scien-
tific experiment gone horribly wrong), and the aafc owners decided to 
continue for another year. The Chicago owners were undoubtedly sacrific-
ing money for the sake of loyalty to their fellow owners. Branch Rickey, 
still keen on professional football, admitted, “This new team will be as 
much Brooklyn’s as New York’s. The fact that financial support was poor 
in Brooklyn must be traced to the poor team we gave the Brooklyn fans. 
. . . I’m certain they will travel to the Stadium.”91 Rickey’s prediction proved 
chimerical.
 As the peace embers flickered, owners began pointing fingers. Buffalo 
owner James Breuil blamed George Marshall and Tim Mara because of 
their refusal to accept continuation of the Buffalo Bills and Baltimore Colts. 
Breuil revealed that Marshall was willing to let the Colts’ owners buy into 
the Redskins, but at a “ridiculous figure.” The Maras were willing to let 
Breuil buy into a merged team comprised of Collins’s Yanks and Topping’s 
Yankees. Breuil turned down the offer, since he wanted Buffalo to remain 
in professional football. Given the weakness of the Yanks and Yankees, his 
decision was probably astute. Bert Bell denied Breuil’s allegations and stated 
that Tim Mara wasn’t at the meeting, nor did Marshall obstruct anything. 
“In accusing Mara and Marshall of blocking so-called ‘peace,’ Mr. Breuil 
is speaking strictly for Buffalo consumption.”92 The nfl owners may still 
have felt they had little to lose by waiting out the faltering aafc and then 
bringing in the two or three most desirable teams.
 When the Dodgers and Yankees merged, the putative beneficiary was 
the new, resurrected Chicago Hornets, formerly the Chicago Rockets. The 
Dodger-Yankee team took seven of the Dodgers’ players and the remaining 
twenty-nine went to bolster the new Hornets. While the Brooklyn–New 
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York team went 8-4, the Chicago team staggered to a 4-8 record in 1949. 
The two teams occasionally had crowds of thirty thousand, but almost 
as often had crowds of less than fifteen thousand. Reflecting the aafc’s 
parlous state, the owners voted to trim playing rosters from thirty-five to 
thirty-two players.93
 Sportswriter Grantland Rice, famed for the “Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse” image of Notre Dame football, excoriated the owners for 
failing to come up with an agreement. Rice thought that two leagues in a 
setup similar to baseball’s would have been good for the game. Rice quoted 
Steelers owner Art Rooney, who indicated he would not operate the Steel-
ers in 1950 unless a deal was made. Rice also thought nfl owners would 
not be sorry to see the Los Angeles Rams (and Dons) disappear, citing the 
expense of traveling to Los Angeles. Another reporter, though, contested 
Rice’s dismal depiction of Pittsburgh; Pat Livingston claimed in October 
1953 that “so solidly had [coach Jock Sutherland] built the Steelers that, 
even during the battle between the National League and the All-America 
Conference, the Steelers made money each year of the costly war.”94
 The 1949 season began inauspiciously. Attendance was off, and sports-
writer Harry Sheer wrote, “Gate receipts are dangerously off, wavering 
towards red-ridden books — and we didn’t mean Joe Stalin’s library. As of 
today, only two of the total of seventeen clubs are reasonably certain of 
clearing 1949 in the black [Bears and Redskins].”95 Sheer went on to quote 
a football owner truism, “One bad Sunday can put you into the red for the 
entire year.” He also listed the expenses of running a team; they totaled 
$600,000, including $60,000 for sundry items. He figured that nfl teams 
needed twenty-five thousand paid admissions per game and aafc teams 
needed thirty thousand to break even and noted the importance of season-
ticket receipts, of which the Bears and Redskins were the chief recipients.
The Peace Accord
“Give peace a chance” surfaced again even before the end of the 1949 
season. A Chicago newspaper claimed the two leagues would merge into 
a twelve-team circuit, but both commissioners, Bell of the nfl and O. 
O. (Scrappy) Kessing, denied the rumor.96 Paul Brown, though, couldn’t 
resist using the rumors to castigate George Preston Marshall as the real 
Buy the Book
32 The Usurpers
culprit for the failure to reach an agreement. Brown claimed he heard 
Marshall tell struggling owners they should “get out of football”; he also 
said that Dan Reeves “spoke scathingly to me of what he thought of 
George Preston Marshall for holding up the peace, and by so doing driv-
ing other club owners to the wall.” Brown believed that Bert Bell misled 
reporters when he told them that nine nfl owners opposed including 
Baltimore in any settlement, but this may have been in response (and in 
resignation) to Marshall’s insistence that he would never accept a Bal-
timore club. In a subsequent article, Cleveland owner Mickey McBride 
echoed Brown’s statement, as he was certain the Tim Mara would prove 
reasonable. McBride claimed his payroll went from $180,000 in 1946 to 
$270,000 in 1949, although part of this rise no doubt emanated from the 
continued success of his team.97
 Marshall’s intransigence, even in the face of the unanimity clause, should 
have been resolvable. Economists would suggest a side payment to him to 
acquiesce in the “violation” of his territorial rights, and, in fact, months 
later, the Baltimore owners made a payment to Marshall, although the 
other owners could have pooled money to placate him. In fact, Marshall 
himself pointed the way to a resolution. By December 1949 he was willing 
to negotiate with the Baltimore Colts if they would satisfy nfl admission 
requirements and pay the Redskins for trespassing upon his territorial 
rights.98
 A week later the owners agreed to a settlement. Thirteen teams would 
comprise the National-American League, an unwieldy title that would 
quietly revert to the National Football League in 1953, along with the elimi-
nation of the American and National Conferences, renamed as the Eastern 
and Western Divisions. Baltimore, San Francisco, and Cleveland joined 
the ten nfl teams. The Chicago Hornets disappeared without a struggle. 
The Los Angeles Dons merged with the Rams, while the Bills’ owner, 
James Breuil, purchased an interest in the Cleveland Browns. Ted Collins 
purchased Dan Topping’s New York Yankees and merged them with his 
transplanted New York Bulldogs. In return for acquiescing to the Bulldogs’ 
invasion of their territory, the New York Giants were to receive six players 
from the former Yankees. The thirteen remaining teams retained rights 
to their current player rosters. They conducted a draft of college players 
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from a common pool, although both leagues had drafted some players 
in early drafts. The fate of the players on the teams that folded remained 
undecided.99
The Aftermath
In the aftermath, some observers gave Horace Stoneham, owner of baseball’s 
New York Giants, credit for the agreement. Stoneham, as landlord for the 
football Giants and potentially for the New York Bulldogs, wanted peace so 
that professional football would survive and gate receipts at games in New 
York City would increase. He summoned Bert Bell and J. Arthur Friedlund, 
the aafc representative, to his office. From there, they got Marshall’s assent 
to allowing Baltimore into the league. Marshall ignored rumors that he had 
blocked any agreements in the past because of his refusal to countenance a 
Baltimore franchise and said, “My only comment on the settlement, is that 
I’m glad Baltimore at last gets a chance to get into major league football.” 
Of course he demanded and received an indemnity from the Baltimore 
owners, but he proved coy in responding to a reporter’s query about the 
nominal fee: “You’re from Washington. You ought to know that anything 
under one billion dollars is considered nominal in this town.”100 Baltimore 
agreed to indemnify Marshall $100,000 for “invading” his territory. After 
the Colts lasted just one season in the nfl, Marshall refunded $50,000 to 
Abraham Watner, the Colts’ owner.101
 Tim Mara explained the financial aspects of the agreement. nfl owners 
were concerned about the Los Angeles Dons and Chicago Hornets because 
of those teams’ low average net ticket prices of $1.61 and $1.82 respectively. 
Mara claimed that teams needed to both attract large crowds and also get 
an average net ticket price of $2.50 to be successful. (He politely declined 
to state another obvious reason for not wanting the Dons and Hornets: 
they competed with nfl teams in those cities.) He detailed how the nfl 
owners warmly embraced the San Francisco franchise because it would 
enable owners to mitigate the cost of traveling westward.102 Assuming the 
Giants had to play a fixed number of road games, though, his analysis is 
flawed. The owners should have been concerned only about the cost dif-
ference between going to Los Angeles and going to another league city.
 Mara also thought the merger was good because the players would be 
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concentrated on thirteen instead of seventeen teams. He hoped this would 
result in more evenly matched teams than in the past, as he feared a repeat 
of the aafc experience, in which the Browns’ dominance appeared to 
hurt everybody’s gate, even Cleveland’s. He lauded Bert Bell’s efforts and 
claimed five of the ten nfl teams were in the black for 1949.103
 Ted Collins was excited about being able to shift his team to the Yan-
kee Stadium, while his New York counterpart, Jack Mara, chortled, “Of 
course, we’re happy about the ‘war’ being over. Now, maybe, the football 
writers can write football instead of finance.” Topping explained that he 
had learned that “baseball and football could not be operated by the same 
organization and, as everyone knows, baseball is the primary interest of 
the New York Yankees.” Bert Bell had to dampen enthusiasm about the 
agreement by stating there would be no championship game between the 
Cleveland Browns and the eventual nfl champion in 1949, because the 
league constitution barred such games.104
 All would not continue to be sweetness and light between the New 
York owners, with a dispute brewing over the six players from the defunct 
Yankees. Topping later stated that he had long been willing to step out of 
football and become a football landlord at Yankee Stadium if it meant 
peace.105 Collins and the Maras argued over which “six players” the Giants 
would get. Bert Bell finally resolved the issue by having the two teams 
alternate choosing players until the Giants got their six.106
 After the Browns defeated the 49ers in the aafc Championship Game, 
Paul Brown groused about the proposed conference alignments. He didn’t 
think Cleveland would fare well at the (visiting) gate playing Detroit, the 
Chicago Cardinals, Los Angeles, Baltimore, and San Francisco.107
 Brown’s remark indicated that while peace was at hand, settling the 
details remained contentious. Owners began jockeying for the best sched-
ule matchups. Some teams wanted to retain old rivalries. Many of the 
established nfl teams wanted to avoid the West Coast road trips. Because 
there were thirteen teams in the league, setting up balanced divisions 
was impossible. For businessmen with limited valuable time, nfl own-
ers (and their newfound aafc chums) were willing to spend hours and 
days haggling over relatively minor points. Brown’s boss, Mickey McBride, 
whined, “Unless we get what we need in personnel to fill our gaps plus a 
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place in the division with the better clubs, then we’ll not be interested in 
the new league and we’ll be out of business.” His dream division lineup 
included the Eagles, Redskins, Bears, Giants, and Lions.108 Bell ultimately 
stepped in and arranged the divisions and schedule. The Baltimore Colts 
were designated as a swing team, the one team that would play each of the 
other twelve teams. The divisional lineups were similar to those stated in 
the original merger agreement, and to the lineups that Bell had planned 
from the beginning.109
 The owners finally settled on a method for distributing players. Bert 
Bell’s brother, John, a distinguished jurist who might have been concerned 
about potential antitrust issues, advised “definitely against the distribution 
of, or the making of any list pertaining to the distribution of any players 
on the reserve list of Buffalo, Chicago Hornets, Los Angeles Dons, or the 
New York Yankees with the exception of those members of the New York 
Yankees team who had been turned over by the terms of the Agreement 
by Mr. Topping to the Commissioner’s office.”110 The college draft would 
include professional players who were members of the New York Bulldogs, 
while other professional players who had been members of now-defunct 
aafc teams or who had been cut as rosters were adjusted would be placed 
in a separate draft pool.111
 The last aafc commissioner, O. O. Kessing, could not accept reality and 
expressed his displeasure of the agreement, and he hinted that the aafc 
would continue playing. He wanted two separate leagues that would meet 
in a championship game. Some of the former aafc teams did not give up 
hope of joining the nfl. Buffalo fans sought to demonstrate their support 
for the Bills by purchasing five-dollar and ten-dollar subscriptions to fund 
a resurrected team. Bert Bell, while claiming admiration and respect for 
the Buffalo fans’ enthusiasm, put off the franchise with vague promises 
of future consideration. His statement, “While I don’t say Buffalo will get 
a franchise, I certainly can’t say that the city won’t,” was a masterpiece of 
doublespeak.112 Buffalo residents contributed more than $250,000, and 
the committee in charge of bringing pro football back to the city raised 
its goal to $500,000 to ensure solvency. Bert Bell announced that nfl 
owners would consider adding Buffalo and Houston. Glenn McCarthy, a 
Houston oilman, headed the group seeking a Houston club, although he 
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also claimed that he was willing to buy the Cleveland Browns and move 
them to Houston. Bell’s announcement included two conditions: “First, 
that the new franchises gain unanimous approval from the thirteen nfl 
owners, and second that they would fit into the schedule.” He claimed that 
making a schedule for thirteen teams was easier than for fourteen and 
fifteen, and said that scheduling sixteen teams “is like ‘rolling off a log.’”113
 Bell later told Buffalo fans that it wasn’t the franchise money that mat-
tered but season ticket sales, so in a Pavlovian response, Buffalo fans signed 
fourteen thousand season-ticket pledges. Bell probably knew that Buffalo 
would not get unanimous support from the owners, particularly the New 
York Giants’ owners; he also probably knew a blunt denial of their appli-
cation could raise the ire of prominent politicians in upstate New York. 
The league turned down a motion, made by George Preston Marshall, to 
expand to fourteen teams. Some of those dissenting (Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, and both Chicago teams) stated they were concerned about the 
problems of a fourteen-team schedule, which seems disingenuous given 
that a thirteen-team schedule meant imbalanced conferences and bye 
weeks.114
 Even with peace, aafc and nfl participants could not resist hurling 
brickbats at each other. Otto Graham joked that the aafc absorbed the 
nfl in the merger and that the Browns would “do all right” in the nfl, 
while blaming Marshall for the delay. Marshall, never one to avoid an 
opportunity to make an ill-humored insult, retorted that the Graham might 
not “be able to hold a job in the new league.” Since these insults occurred 
at a league function, one is entitled to wonder whether the exchange was 
rehearsed. Sportswriter Shirley Povich had an astute reading of the situ-
ation: “If Marshall didn’t [enjoy the exchange], he will start taking some 
satisfaction out of the episode next season when he counts the gate receipts 
of the Redskins-Browns game.”115
 The big losers were fans of the now-defunct aafc teams in Los Angeles, 
Chicago, Buffalo, and New York City. Players were also big losers. There 
were now fewer roster slots among the surviving teams; in addition, the 
common draft meant there was less competition for draft choices. Sports-
writer Stan Baumgartner noted the immediate drop in salary offerings: 
“Before the peace, [Leon] Hart was said to be asking $25,000 a year. Now he 
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will be lucky to get $15,000.” He predicted that players would “be thankful” 
to get $200 a game. Bert Bell announced, “Players’ salaries will be predicated 
strictly on the financial condition of the clubs and the patronage of the 
league.”116 Bell, however, received a salary boost and a contract extension 
for his efforts.
 Sportswriter Joe Williams sounded a note of optimism as the 1950 season 
opened:
If pro football is ever to establish itself as a major sport on a sound finan-
cial basis, it would seem now is the time — granting the world does not 
come apart at the seams in the meantime. . . . Artistically, pro football 
should reach an all-time peak this season. Peace was desirable and to 
an extent will prove profitable at the gate, but no guarantee came with it 
that there no longer will be deficits. There never has been a season in 30 
years of trying that pro football, as a league operation, made money. In 
this respect it is an operation without precedent in the history of sports.
Williams said that Tim Mara admitted that the Giants have “done little 
better than break even for his 26 years in the league.”117
 Even before the 1950 season began, a dubious nostalgia for the aafc 
arose. George Preston Marshall lamented the demise of the aafc because 
the leagues’ strife had created reams of publicity. Some of the other owners 
agreed with him and lauded his suggestion of putting a league publicity 
office in New York City.118
 How good were aafc teams? No one knows for certain, of course. 
One clue rested with reporters’ summation of top playing talent. For two 
seasons, the Associated Press named All-Pro teams. The writers named 
six nfl and five aafc players for 1948. In 1949 seven nfl players were 
among the eleven on the “first team” and six were among the eleven on the 
“second team” in The Sporting News’ postseason honors.119 These results 
implied that football writers thought aafc teams at least had some excel-
lent individual talent.
Why the nfl Triumphed
The nfl was unable to keep the aafc from getting sufficient numbers of 
quality players. Its secret draft and threats of blacklists failed to deter players 
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from signing with aafc teams. The nfl’s attempt to use the schedule to 
weaken aafc New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles franchises had limited 
success. While the aafc’s Chicago team staggered throughout the four 
seasons, this may have been because of its poor record on the field and its 
misfortune in having to face resurgent Bears and Cardinals. New York and 
Los Angeles proved contested battlegrounds throughout the four seasons.
 Perhaps the nfl benefited more from aafc defects and missteps than 
from any of its own stratagems. The aafc was not helped by instability at 
the top; it employed new commissioners on an almost yearly basis. The nfl 
benefited from Bert Bell’s strength and pugnacity. The Cleveland Browns’ 
dominance, while creating national attention for the league, proved a mixed 
blessing. As half the teams in the league were consistently weak on the field, 
the viable franchises struggled to survive. If anything saved the nfl, it was 
Paul Brown’s genius, in that the competitive imbalance weakened some of 
the aafc teams. The aafc’s personnel remained proud of their efforts, as 
reflected in the preface to the league’s posthumous publication reviewing 
the 1949 season: “That the performances of aafc players and teams may 
be available to the present generation of writers and commentators, and 
that they may be preserved for future football historians, this supplement 
to the 1949 Record Manual is published.”120
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